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Summary findings
Limao and Venables use three different data sets to  The median landlocked country has only 30 percent
investigate how transport depends on geography and  of the trade volume of the median coastal economy.
infrastructure.  Landlocked countries have high transport  Halving transport costs increases the volume of
costs, which can be substantially reduced by improving  trade by a factor of five.
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countries.  percentile increases trade by 50 percent.
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importance of infrastructure. Limao and Venables  Sub-Saharan African trade, both internally and with the
estimate the elasticity of trade flows with regard to  rest of the world, Limao and Venables find that
transport costs to be high, at about -2.5.  This means  infrastructure problems largely explain the relatively low
that:  levels of African trade.
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email: avenables@worldbank.orgNon-technical summary:  Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage and Transport Costs
N. Limao, A.J. Venables
The real costs of trade - the transport and other costs of doing business internationally - are important
determinants of a country's ability to participate fully in the world economy.  Remoteness and poor
transport and communications infrastructure isolate countries, inhibiting their participation in global
production networks.  Recent liberalizations have reduced artificial trade barriers, and mean that the
effective rate of protection provided by transport costs is, for many countries, considerably higher than
that provided by tariffs.  To bring countries further into the trading system it is important to understand
both the determinants of transport costs, and the magnitude of the barriers to trade that they create.
This paper studies the determinants of transport costs, and shows how they depend both on
countries'  geography, and on their levels of infrastructure (measured by an index combining road, rail
and telecommunications density). Our research uses three data sets.  The first is shipping company
quotes for the cost of transporting a standard container from Baltimore to selected destinations.  The
advantages of this measure are that it is the true cost of transporting a homogenous good, and that it
gives the city of origin, the city of landfall, and the final destination city.  The disadvantages are that it
is not clear how the experience of Baltimore generalizes, since charges are affected by the particular
routes, frequencies, and opportunities for back-hauling and for exploiting monopoly power that are
present.  Our second data set uses the cif/ fob ratios reported for each country by the IMF.  These are
representative, in so far as they cover the entire imports of each reporting country. However, there are
some questions regarding the quality of the data, and the measure suffers from the fact that it is an
aggregate over all commodity types imported.  Our third piece of analysis uses bilateral trade data in a
gravity modeling exercise, adding to the standard independent variables our measures of geography and
infrastructure.
Our main results are, first, that infrastructure - both own infrastructure and that landlocked
countries' transit routes -- is a significant and quantitatively important determinant of transport costs
and of bilateral trade flows.  For example, improving destination infrastructure by one standard
deviation reduces transport costs by an amount equivalent to a reduction of 6,500 sea km or 1,000km of
overland travel.
Second, being landlocked raises transport costs by around 50% (for the median landlocked
country compared to the median coastal economy).  However, improving the infrastructure of the
landlocked economy from the median for landlocked economies to the 25th  percentile reduces this
disadvantage by 12 percentage points, and improving the infrastructure of the transit economy by the
same amount reduces the disadvantage by a further 7 percentage points.
Third, combining estimates from transport cost data with the trade data we are able to compute
the elasticity of trade with respect to transport costs;  it is high, at around -2.5.  This means that the
median landlocked country only has 30% of the trade volume of the median coastal economy.
Improving infrastructure to the 25th  percentiles raises this to over 40%.
Finally, we use our results to study Sub-Saharan African trade.  While a basic gravity model
suggests that African trade, both internally and with the rest of the world, is lower than would be
predicted, augmenting the model to include infrastructure moves the predicted values much closer to
the actual.  Most of Africa's  poor trade performance can be accounted for by poor infrastructure.
i1. Introduction
The real costs of trade - the transport and other costs of doing business internationally - are
important determinants of a country's ability to participate fully in the world economy.  Remoteness
and poor transport and communications infrastructure isolate countries, inhibiting their participation in
global production networks.'  Recent liberalizations have reduced artificial trade barriers, and now
mean that the effective rate of protection provided by transport costs is, for many countries,
considerably higher than that provided by tariffs.2 To bring countries further into the trading system it
is important to understand both the determinants of transport costs, and the magnitude of the barriers to
trade that they create.  Investigation of these issues is the goal of this paper.
This paper studies the determinants of transport costs, and shows how they depend both on
countries'  geography, and on their levels of infrastructure. The geographical measures we focus on are
distance between countries, whether or not they share a common border, and whether they are
landlocked or islands. The infrastructure measures relate to the quality of transport and
communications infrastructure they possess.  Although the importance of infrastructure for transport
costs is well established in regional and transport economics, the few empirical studies of international
transport costs often neglect this and focus on geographical and product characteristics. 3 We show that
infrastructure is quantitatively important in determining transport costs, a finding with important policy
implications for infrastructure investment. For example, improving own and transit countries'
infrastructure from the 25th  percentile to the 75th  percentile overcomes approximately two-thirds of the
disadvantage associated with being landlocked.
Our research uses several different data sets. The first is shipping company quotes for the cost
of transporting a standard container from Baltimore to selected destinations.  The advantages of this
measure are that it is the true cost of transporting a homogenous good, and that it gives the city of
origin, the city of landfall, and the final destination city. The disadvantages are that it is not clear how
the experience of Baltimore generalizes, since charges are affected by the particular routes,
frequencies,
I Increasing  trade in components  and the geographical  fragrnentation  of some  production  processes  make  transport  costs
even  more important  See  Feenstra  (1998)  and the references  quoted  therein  for evidence  of the increase  in  the
importance  of intermediate  goods  trade. Radelet  and Sachs  (1998)  show how sensitive  value added  is to transport
costs in a vertically fragmented activity.
2 See  Finger  and Yeats (1976)  for U.S.  Post-Kennedy  Round data on nominal  and effective  rates of protection  afforded  by
tariffs and transport  costs. See Hummels  (1998)  for recent  data on nominal  rates for  the U.S., New Zealand,  Argentina
and Brazil.
3 An exception  to this is Radelet  and Sachs  (1998)  where  port quality  is entered  as an explanatory  variable  for transport
costs.and opportunities for back-hauling and for exploiting monopoly power that are present. Our second
data set uses the cif/ fob ratios reported for each country by the IMF.  These are representative, in so far
as they cover the entire imports of each reporting country.  However, there are some questions
regarding the quality of the data, and the measure suffers from the fact that it is an aggregate over all
commodity types imported.
In addition to the determinants of transport costs, we want to know the extent to which transport
costs choke off trade.  To do this we undertake a gravity modeling exercise, incorporating the same
geographical and infrastructure measures that we use estimating trade costs.  This strongly confirms the
importance of these variables in determining trade, and also enables to compute estimates of the
elasticity of trade flows with respect to transport costs.  We find that this elasticity is extremely large,
with a doubling of transport costs typically reducing trade flows by more than 80%.
Taken together, our approaches provide a rather consistent picture of the determinants of
transport costs, and in particular of the importance of infrastructure in source and destination countries,
and also in any transit countries used by landlocked economies.  We draw out the implications of our
findings by looking in some detail at trade and transport costs in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Our measures
indicate that many of these economies have extremely high transport costs, and we show how taking
infrastructure into account explains much of the relative trade performance of these countries.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we discuss the determinants of transport
costs and present estimates for the transport cost equation using the shipping data and the cif/fob data.
In section three we present the gravity results. In section four we compare and contrast the results from
the transport cost and gravity analyses, and derive an estimate of the elasticity of trade flows with
respect to transport costs.  We show that improvements in the infrastructure of landlocked countries
and their transit countries can dramatically increase trade flows;  moving from the 7 5 th  percentile to the
25th in the distribution of infrastructure quality more than halves the cost penalty for being landlocked,
and more than doubles the volume of trade.  In section five we combine the results of the previous
sections to derive a bilateral transport cost matrix which is used to analyze trade and transport costs in
Sub-Saharan Africa.
22. Transport costs
2.1 The determinants of transport costs
Let Tu denote the unit cost of shipping a particular good from country i to country.  We suppose
that it is determined by:
Tjj=  T(x,,  Xi,  XPiJ)  I
where xV 1 is a vector of characteristics relating to the journey between i andj, Xi is a vector of
characteristics of country i, Xj is a vector of characteristics of countryj,  and pty represents all
unobservable variables.
What are the relevant observable characteristics of countries and the journeys between them?
For the journey between we use two types of measures. The first is whether the countries share a
common border, which we take to be cost reducing, and the second is the shortest direct distance
between countries, as is standard practice in the literature.  The importance of distance for transport
costs is obvious but why should sharing a border reduce transport costs after controlling for distance?
First, neighboring countries typically have more integrated transport networks which reduce the
number of transhipments, e.g. from rail to road or across different types of rail gauge. Second,
neighboring countries are more likely to have transit and customs agreements that reduce transit times
and translate into lower shipping and insurance costs. Finally, the higher volume of trade between
neighbor countries dramatically increases the possibilities for backhauling allowing the fixed costs to
be shared over two trips.
For country characteristics we focus on geographical and infrastructure measures.  The main
geographical measures are simply whether the country is landlocked and whether it is an island.  The
infrastructure measure we use is designed to measure the costs of travel in and through a country. It is
constructed as an average of the density of the road network, the paved road network, the rail network,
and the number of telephones per person. In our regressions we always work with an inverse measure
of this index, so that an increase in the variable inf  is expected to be associated with an increase in the
costs of transport. Details on the construction of this and other variables are given in appendix I. 4
2.2 Shippingfrom  Baltimore:
4 Three  important  country  characteristics  we do not analyze  are the existence  of agreements  between  landlocked  and  transit
countries,  the efficiency  and  transparency  of customs  procedures  and  the market  structure  of transport  services  facing
different  countries,  the last two due  to lack of data.
3Our first results are based on the costs of shipping a standard 40' container from Baltimore to
different destinations around the world 5. The data was provided by a firm that handles forwarding for
the World Bank, and covers 64 destination cities, 35 of which are in landlocked countries (a list of
these is given in table 2, appendix I).
This source of data has two major advantages.  The first is that it enables us to break journeys
down into component parts - the data gives the landfall city for each journey, as well as the final
destination city -- allowing the estimation of the effect of land and sea distance separately. The second
is that the good shipped is homogeneous, avoiding compositional problems that can occur in aggregate
data. 6
We estimate a linear version of equation (1) both for the entire journey (columns 1 and 3 of
table 1) and for the journey divided into the sea journey (to the port) and the land journey (from the
port, columns 2 and 4).  More specifically we estimate:
I
T, =a+8'xi,  +±y'X;  +±'X_ +±v,  (2)
where i corresponds to Baltimore in the U.S. and j  represents the destination city.  The error term vy, is
assumed to be independent of the explanatory variables and normally distributed.
It is not clear a priori what the most appropriate functional form is. On the one hand the fact
that we are adding up over the different legs of the trip, i.e. the cost of going through the infrastructure
of importer, exporter and the cost of shipping between them, suggests a linear form. On the other hand,
it is possible that there are interactions between the cost variables which would make a nonlinear form
more suitable. The simplest example is that an increase in land distance should increase the cost of
going through a given infrastructure. For this reason we also experimented with some nonlinear forms,
but they were rejected by the data. Therefore table 1 presents the OLS estimation results of the linear
form given by equation (2):
5The  data refers  to the cost of shipping  a 40' container;  the mode is surface  (as opposed  to air), type is freight  (as opposed
to household  goods)  and packing  is loose (as  opposed  to lift van  where  the cargo is packed  into wooden  containers).
The cost does not include  insurance.
6 UNCTAD  (1995,  pg. 58) presents  similar  data for a sample  of four coastal  countries  and nine landlocked  countries  in
Sub-Saharan  Africa .Livingstone  (1986)  uses quotes  made  by regular  shippers  to the Crown  agents  from the UK to
eight  African  countries.  The reduced  size of the sample  in  both studies  does not allow for a systematic  examination  of
the determinants  of transport  costs.
4Table 1:
Cost (Thousand US $, 1998) of shipping 40' container from Baltimore
Dependent variable: Transport cost (T 4y)
1  2  3  4
Inf  1.31  1.56*
(2.51)  (2.92)
Inftran  1.34**  0.67
(1.93)  (0.88)
Idldummy  3.45*  2.17*
(4.75)  (2.94)
Distance  0.38**  0.29*
(2.6)  (1.84)
Distsea  0.19**  0.18
(2.12)  (1.74)
Distland  1.38*  1.49***
(4.66)  (1.77)
Constant  1.1  2.06  0.11  -0.1
(0.95)  (1.85)  (.093)  (-0.07)
n  64  64  47  47
R sq.  0.32  0.47  0.38  0.43
F-test (p-values)
Infn  Inftran  - - - 0.00
Infiran, distland  - - - 0.03
Notes:
1) Distances  are in 1000's Km.Distance  and Idldummy  are for 1998. The infrastructure  variables  used are an average
between 1990  and 1995  (the Latest  year available). The sample  used in the last two specifications  is reduced  to the
countries  for which  the infrastructure  variables  are also available.  Idldummy=1  if the country  has no access  to the sea, 0
otherwise
2)***,**,*  indicates  significance  at 10%,  5%  and 1%  respectively.  T-statistics  in parenthesis. The F-tests  are for the pairs
of variables  indicated,  the p-values  show  the level  at which  the null of no  joint significance  is rejected.
3) For specifications  I and 3 the s.e. errors  were adjusted  to correct  for heteroskedasticity.
The first two columns give results excluding the infrastructure variables.  There are three main
conclusions. First, being landlocked raises costs by $3,450 - compared to the mean cost for non-
landlocked countries of $4,620.  Second, breaking the journey into an overland and sea component
considerably improves the fit of the equation, and gives a much larger coefficient for the overland
portion of the trip 7; an extra 1000 km by sea adds $190 whereas a similar increase in land distance adds
This  is true  even  when  quadratic  terms  are  added  to capture  any  non-linearity.  These  terms  are  insignificant  further
justifying  the use of the linear  land and sea distance  measures.
5$1,380.  When this value is compared to the $380 per 10OOkm  predicted by straight line distance it
becomes clear that using the latter measure leads to a large underestimate of the impact of distance on
transport costs. Third, the additional transport cost from being landlocked is not fully explained by the
extra overland distance that must be overcome to reach the sea. Although the final city destination for
landlocked countries is on average four times further from the sea than the final city destination of
coastal countries in this sample the landlocked dummy remains significant after land distance is
controlled for.  There are several possible reasons for this, arising from border delays or transport
coordination problems, uncertainty and delays creating higher insurance costs, and direct charges that
may be made by the transit country 8.
Columns 3 and 4 introduce our measures of the inverse infrastructure of the destination (inf)
and, for landlocked countries, the transit country (inftran). The signs of these are as would be
expected, inferior infrastructures leading to higher transport costs. Improving destination infrastructure
by 1 standard deviation reduces transport costs by around $1,200 (compared to a mean of $5,980),
equivalent to reducing distance by around 6,500 sea km, or 1,000 land km.  The final specification
(column 4) also breaks distance into the overland and sea components. The coefficients on these
distance variables are very similar to those in the full sample (column 2), although splitting the distance
variable makes the coefficient for transit infrastructure smaller and insignificant. The reason for this is
the variable's  high positive correlation with land distance. Moreover transit and own infrastructure are
also highly correlated (an issue that will be further addressed below). This multicollinearity poses
problems for identifying the separate effects of the two variables, but the tests of significance at the
bottom of table 1 confirm the importance of the transit variable when considered jointly with either
own infrastructure or land distance. 9
8  For example,  Kenya  charges  a transit  goods  license  for road  transit  of $200 (per  entry  or 30 days) and tolls on trucks
(UNCTAD  1997,  pg. 11).
9We  experimented  with some  further  analysis  of this data. For 20 landlocked  countries  in the sample  we have  both the
costs of shipping  to the port,  and the full cost  of shipping  to the landlocked  destination  (for  example,  the costs of
shipping  from Baltimore  to Durban,  as well as the costs  of shipping  from Baltimore  to Harare  via Durban). This
enables  us to look at the determinants  of the incremental  costs associated  with  the final  stage  of the journey. Final
destination  infrastructure  turns out to be significant  and  positive,  but neither  distance  nor port infrastructure  are
significant in this estimation. This is due not only to the small number of observations but also to some finer details
that  become apparent  upon inspection  of the data. For example,  we see  that shipping  from Baltimore  to Durban  costs
$2,500,  and shipping  the 1,600  further  Kms  to Lusaka  an additional  $2,500,  whereas  the 347 Kms from Durban  to
Maseru  (Lesotho)  cost an additional  $7,500. This simply  points  to the importance  of the fine details  of geography,
market  structure  and size in addition  to the broader  picture  painted  by the econometrics.
62.3 Cif/fob measures
Our second set of experiments is based on the cif/fob ratio as reported by the IMF.'0 The ratio
gives, for each country, the value of imports inclusive of carriage, insurance and freight, relative to
their free on board value, the cost of the imports and all charges incurred in placing the merchandise
aboard a carrier in the exporting port. The ratio cif/fob - 1 represents the ratio of unit transport costs to
the fob price and thus provides a simple summary statistic of the transport cost rate on imports.
The advantage of the cif/fob measure is that we have data for more countries than are in the
shipping data.  However, it has several drawbacks.  The first is measurement error; the cif/fob factor is
calculated for those countries that report the total value of imports at cif and fob values, both of which
involve some measurement error.  Moreover not all countries report these every year and thus some of
the values the IMF reports for 1990 appear not to have been updated. "  l  The second concern is that the
measure aggregates over all commodities imported, so it is biased if high transport cost countries
systematically import lower transport cost goods. This would be particularly important if we were
using exports, which tend to be concentrated in a few specific goods. It is less so for imports which are
generally more diversified and vary less in composition across countries. 12 Finally, the measure
aggregates over the different sources of supply, so for each importer there is a single cif/fob measure,
not a full set of cif/fob measures for imports from each supplying country.  Correspondingly, when we
construct variables describing the characteristics of each country's import suppliers we have to
construct a single average measure, which we do by constructing import weighted shares.  We use
bilateral trade data to do this, so, for example, for each country we construct the import weighted
average distance of its supplying countries.
Given concerns about the quality of the cif/fob data we perform several comparisons of the
results obtained using this data with those using the shipping cost data (the comparisons are in sections
4 and 5.1).  They confirm that the cif/fob data does contain information about the cross sectional
variation in transport costs, and that results from using this data are quite consistent with those obtained
from the shipping cost data.
In theory the fob and cif prices are border prices and thus it would seem that own and trading
partner infrastructures as defined here should not affect these rates. There are three reasons why they
10  IFS (1995) using values for 1990. See appendix table I for data sources.
For an early description of the problems with this data see Moneta (1959) .
12 Hummels 1998b provides a good account of the cross-commodity variation in transport costs using disaggregated data
for four countries.
7are indeed relevant. First road, rail and telephone infrastructure are likely to be highly correlated with
port infrastructure (for which we have no data) and the latter would be important even if the prices
were pure border prices.  Second, the insurance component will reflect the total time in transit, i.e. from
door to door, not just border to border;  total transit time is likely to be a function of own and partner
infrastructure.  Finally, according to U.N. experts on customs data, the fob and cif figures are rarely
border prices, instead measuring the prices at the initial point of departure and final destination
respectively'3. Thus own and partner infrastructure should be included in the estimation.
Denoting the true transport cost rate between i and] by ty,  and the fob price of a given good
shipped from i to j  by py we have
=t
t= =t  (xu  x  ,XJ  XjAdy
where the second equation uses the determinants of Ts, given in (1), and assumes that the determinants
ofpy, other than xy, Xi and Xj, are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables.  Since we do not have
data on the bilateral transport cost rates we aggregate (3) over all of country j's  partners by taking
logarithmic averages and using import shares, sy, as the weights. Assuming that t can be approximated
by a loglinear function up to some measurement error we have the average observed transport cost
rates tj as:
Int;  =  Isylntq  +C
i  (4)
lntj  =a+3'lnX 1 +f'Ysy  lnx# +Y'JsV  lnXi  +cj
i  i
where the tildes distinguish this set of parameters from the partial effects of the measures on transport
cost per unit, T, estimated in the shipping section. In terms of the data, tj corresponds to the ratio cif/fob
- 1 for importing country j.14
Before proceeding two comments are in order, one on the functional form assumed for (3) and
the other on the effects of the weighting of partner characteristics. As in the shipping section the
functional form is to a large degree an empirical question. We have previously noted that there are
good reasons why Tmay be non-linear in its deterninants,  e.g. if country j does not have a container
13  E-mail  contact  with Mr. Peter Lee  at the U.N.
4 Recall  that Xi  refers  to a kixI column  vector  and 3 to a conformable  row vector  of coefficients,  where ki  is the number  of
explanatory  variables  used for partner  countries,  similarly  for Xq  and  Xi.
8port country then i will not benefit from its own container facilities in exporting to j. 5 We found that
the loglinear form fitted the data considerably better than the linear one.
The weighting of partner characteristics will imply that the coefficients for those variables will
in general not be unbiased estimates of the corresponding coefficients of ty, the bilateral transport cost
rate function. This is because of correlation between the weighted variables and the error term
introduced when weighting by the shares and the fact that the shares may themselves be a function of
the transport cost rate. It is not possible to determine the sign of the bias. The endogeneity could in
principle be resolved if a form of the gravity equation was estimated jointly and population or area
were used as instruments, but the weighting would still have to be used given the data constraints. As
we will see the issues above do not do much damage to our estimates of own and transit elasticities for
which we obtain results that are strikingly similar to the ones in the shipping section.
Estimation results
The results from the estimation of (4) are given in table 2. The first three rows of the table are
importing country characteristics;  the log of its infrastructure (lninj;  if it is landlocked, that of its
transit country (or average when there is more than one), ln(l+inftran); and a landlock dummy
(Idldummy). The next four rows give average trading partner characteristics, with notational
convention wvariable = & syj  variable, i.e. partner variables weighted by their shares in country j
imports.  We have the import share weighted sum of the log of distance, (wlndistance), partner
infrastructure (wlnpinj), partners' transit countries' infrastructure (wln(l +pinftran)), and the share of
imports from countries with which j shares a common (wborder).  The last two rows are dummy
variables for country j being an island, and the share of imports coming from islands
The results in table 2 show that poor own and partner infrastructure (lninf and wlnpinfi increase
transport costs significantly, as expected. Transit country infrastructure (ln(l+inftran)) has a similar
effect, although multicollinearity with the landlock dummy and common border variable is a problem,
making it difficult to disentangle the individual effects of explanatory variables and leading to high
standard errors.  Although average distance is significant and cost increasing when the only other
regressor is a landlocked dummy (column 1) it becomes statistically insignificant when own
infrastructure is added. However, the inclusion of the infrastructure measures explains more than twice
as much of the variation in tj than does the basic specification using distance and a landlocked dummy
5 Even  if the true transport  cost  function, T is linear  there is no reason  for the reduced  form of the transport  cost rate, t* to
have the same  functional  form. The reason  for this is that for small  exporters  (facing  a perfectly  elastic  demand)  the
fob price,  pi, will itself depend  on the average  transport  cost  between  themselves  and their importers  an effect
captured  by the reduced  form of t  *1  I
9alone.  The trade weighted average of the trading partners' transit countries infrastructures has the right
sign, but is not significant. Being an island or having a high share of imports from islands reduce
transport costs (column 4) but the effects are insignificant.
The most important message from table 2 is the importance of infrastructure in determining
transport costs. Own infrastructure and transit partner infrastructure are both significant, with an
increase of one s.e. in own and transit infrastructure raising tj by approximately 19% and 14%
respectively.  The trade weighted average of partner infrastructures is also significant, and a one s.e.
increase in this variable raises tj by 15%. We return to these results in section 4, where we compare
them with results from our other approaches.
10Table 2
Average transport cost rate (1990)
Dependent variable: In Transport cost rate (In tj)
1  2  3  4
Ininf  0.72*  0.47*  0.42*
(4.81)  (3.60)  (3.06)
ln(l+inftran)  0.11  0.43**  0.43*
(0.61)  (2.63)  (2.62)
Idldummy  0.29***
(1.70)
wlndistance  0.34*  0.07  -0.08  -0.034
(3.45)  (0.70)  (-0.984)  (-0.36)
wborder  -1.97*  -2.03*
(-6.44)  (-6.44)
wlnpinf  1.55*'  1.74*  1.64*
(2.48)  (3.34)  (3.02)
wln(I +pinftran)  2.96  1.96  1.37





Constant  -2.72*  -2.51  -2.0*  -1.93*
(-22.3)  (-17.2)  (-13.8)  (-12.4)
N  98  98  98  98
Adj. R2 0.12  0.33  0.53  0.53
F-tests (p-values)
lnlnf; wlndistance  - 0.00  -
lnlnf;  lnlnftran  - 0.00  -
wbor, wlndistance  - - 0.00  0.00
Notes:
1) All variables are for the year 1990; isldummy=1 if country is an island, 0 otherwise; wvariable=2sij variable. The
import shares , si, were calculated using U.N. data from the Commtrade database (see Appendix I for more details). The
original transit variable, Infiran, ranges from 0 for the coastal economies to approximately 1.7. Thus, before taking the log
we add 1 to the measure to correctly reflect that coastal economies bear no extra infrastructure transport cost. To compare
the own and transit elasticities we multiply the coefficient of Inlnftran by Inftran  /(1+  Inftran).  This ratio ranges from 0.42
to 0.63 for landlocked countries.
2)  ***,**,* indicates significance at 10%,  5% and 1%  respectively. t-statistics in parenthesis. The F-tests are for the pairs
of variables indicated, the p-values show the level at which the null of no joint significance is rejected.
113. Trade volumes:
Instead of looking directly at trade costs we now look at the trade flows they support, and do
this by estimating a gravity model including the infrastructure variables we have used above.  There are
several reasons for doing this.  First, trade data is much richer than transport cost data - we use the
bilateral trade data for 93 countries.  Second, the variables we have identified as being important in
transport cost equations should also be important in the trade equations, and we want to check that this
is so.  And third, by using the same variables in estimating transport costs and trade equations, we are
able to compute estimates of elasticities of trade flows with respect to transport costs.
The gravity equation is the standard analytical framework for the prediction of bilateral trade
flows. Although its empirical use in the context of international trade dates back to the early 60's the
theoretical underpinnings were not developed until much later16. Despite the abundant number of
theoretical derivations of the gravity equation the majority of them does not model transport costs
explicitly, two exceptions are Bergstrand (1985) and Deardorff (1997).  More recently, in independent
work, Bougheas et. al (1999) incorporate transport infrastructure in a two country Ricardian model and
show under what circumstances it affects trade volumes 17.
Bilateral imports, Mi,, depend on GDPs, Yi  in the standard way, and on the transport cost rate, t
which we model in terms of the geographical and the infrastructure measures used in the preceding
analysis. So we have:
Mij  =  1j  AYi2toj  or  (5)
lnMij  = 00 + 01 In Yj  + 02 InYi  +  Tf3'lnX  j  + 8'lnx.  +  ±'IlnXi  ] + qiU
where the second equality is obtained by taking logs and substituting out the true transport cost rate for
its determinants in the form used to derive equation (4) in the cif/fob  section. We estimate this
equation in the form:
6 See Frankel  (1997) for a discussion  of earlier  references.  For different  theoretical  underpinnings  see Anderson  (1979),
Bergstrand  (1985  and 1989),  Helpman  and Krugman  (1985).
17 Bougheas et al (1999)  estimate augmented gravity equations for a sample limited to nine European  countries. They
include the product of partner's Km of motorway in one specification and that of public capital stock in another and
find these  have a positive  partial  correlation  with  bilateral  exports.  However,  the relevant  measure  for transport  costs  is
infrastructure  density  and/or quality  not the stock.
12In  MM  = A 0 +  IAln  Yj  +  '2  lnYi  + 03 In Distance, + +04border,j  + 'A5isldummy 1 (5
+ 06isldummy, +  07 In Infj + 08 In  Inf,  + 09 ln(I + Inftran1) + 010  In (1 + Inftran,) + 77,
where Mi*  represents country j's  imports from i valued at cif, Yi is nominal GDP and the remaining
variables are the same introduced in the shipping and cif/fob sections. 18
Econometric issues and data
The model is estimated with 1990 data for a sample of 93 countries using two different
approaches.  The most common estimation technique for gravity equations is to perform OLS on the
double log specification as given by equation (5 ). This requires that the zero trade observations be
dropped or somehow adjusted.1 9 Given that the reason two countries do not trade may be precisely
because they have high transport costs (or low incomes) dropping them amounts to a non-random
selection of the data leading to biased estimates of the coefficients. In our case this is an important
concern given that only 73% of the data records positive flows, and the issue is even more relevant for
landlocked countries where approximately half the observations are positive.  (We will see that one of
the largest differences in the coefficients between the OLS and Tobit is for partner transit
infrastructure).  The correct procedure to account for this problem is to employ Tobit estimation. 20
We assume that country  j's  imports from i (in thousands $'s) will be determined by their trade
potential given by the R.H.S. variables of (5 ) for values above 1. Otherwise we assume they have an
arbitrarily small amount of trade. The exact maximum likelihood estimated can be found in appendix
III. Maximum likelihood estimates were obtained using the Newton-Raphson method.
Estimation results
Table 3 contains the results of the estimation.  The first column presents the OLS estimates for the
baseline case which excludes the infrastructure variables. These are the standard regressors, incomes
and distance along with the geographical variables: border and island dummies. The coefficients on
income and distance are similar to those usually found when using OLS. Turning to the baseline results
from the Tobit we note that the geographical variables enter as would be expected: coefficients on
income rise, essentially because a high proportion of the zero trades involve low income countries.
18 The  transit infrastructure  variables  are adjusted  for neighboring  countries,  so if i and  j are neighbors  and  j (i) is
landlocked  then  Inftranj  (Inftran 1) is set to zero since  no transit  country  must be used. So, to be more  precise, in (5')
we should  write for  j (I +Inftran)*(1-bordery)  not (1  +Inftrani)  similarly  for i.
19 For example  Linnemann  (1966) and Wang  and Winters  (1991)  add an arbitrarily  small  number  before taking  logs.
20 Other authors  that have  used Tobit  estimation  in this context  include  Foroutan  and  Pritchett  (1993) and Soloaga  and
Winters  (1999).
13The second and fourth columns add the infrastructure measures. The striking result is the strong
performance of the infrastructure variables used in the preceding analysis. The infrastructures of
importing and exporting countries enter as they should. Likewise, if either the importer or exporter is
landlocked, then the transit country's infrastructure affects trade flows significantly, and with the
correct sign.
A formal test of the restriction that the infrastructure coefficients are zero, i.e. do not belong in
(5  )  strongly rejects that hypothesis. Moreover the large changes in the coefficients estimated in the
baseline case suggest that these will be biased if the infrastructure variables are excluded. The distance
elasticity, which is usually taken as the proxy for transport costs, falls by about 0.14 (corresponding to
3 s.e.) showing that it does indeed proxy for transport costs and not just information costs which are
also bound to increase with distance.  The most dramatic change however is in the income coefficients.
These fall by over 12 s.e., thus some of the trade flows that have typically been attributed to the mass
of the countries are actually due to lower trade costs explained by the fact that countries with higher
GDP have bigger and better infrastructures and thus lower transport costs. 21
So, the importance of including the infrastructure measures is not only that they increase the
predictive power of the gravity estimates but that they eliminate the omitted variable bias in the
baseline regressions and show the impact on trade of an important policy variable (more on the
quantification below). Moreover, as we will show next, the gravity estimates contain valuable
information about the coefficients of the bilateral transport cost rate function ty.
21 The simple  correlation  between  InGDP  and Ininf is -0.68.
14Table 3
Gravity: Value of imports into country j from country i.
OLS  Tobi?
Baseline  With infrast.  Baseline  With infrast.
lnDistance  -1.11*  -1.01  -1.34*  -1.20'
(-31.7)  (-29.0)  (-25.7)  (-23.4)
InY  0.97*  0.85  1.4*  1.20*
(84.1)  (56.3)  (84.9)  (54.3)
InpY  1.08*  0.98*  1.70*  1.46*
(90.2)  (63.3)  (101.3)  (65.8)
border  1.02  1.20  0.55  0.71
(6.16)  (7.28)  (2.21)  (2.91)
isldummy  0.358  0.25*  0.58*  0.42*
(5.04)  (3.67)  (5.77)  (4.17)
pisldummy  -0.010  -0.044  0.301*  0.17 
(-0.15)  (-0.65)  (2.98)  (1.69)
lnInf  -0.73*  -1.23*
(-10.0)  (-11.8)
lnplnf  -0.78*  -1.40*
(-10.7)  (-13.4)
ln(l +Inftran)  -0.67*  -1.02*
(-7.21)  (-8.12)
ln(l +pInftran)  -0.32*  -0.86*
(-3.28)  (-6.78)
N  6236  6236  8556  8556
Adj. RZ  0.69  0.70  - -
Pseudo R'  - - 0.22  0.23
cr  - - 3.18  3.08
1)  All data for 1990
2)  ***, **,* indicates  significance  at 10%,  5%  and 1%  respectively.  t-statistics  in parenthesis.  Constant  included  in all
specifications  but not reported.
3)  Pseudo  P7  =l-L 1/Lo Where  LI is the log likelihood  value of the model  when all the regressors  are included  whereas  Lo
corresponds  to the likelihood  with  constant  term only. This is not directly  comparable  to the OLS  R2.  C gives  the
standard  error of the Tobit  estimate,  see Appendix  III for details.
4)  The original  transit  variables,  Inftran, ranges  from 0 for the coastal  economies  to approximately  1.7.  Thus,  before
taking  the log we add I to the measure  to correctly  reflect  that coastal  economies  bear  no extra infrastructure  transport
cost.  To compare  the own and transit  elasticities  we need  to multiply  the coefficient  of Inlnftran  by Inf ran  /(1+
inftran). This  ratio ranges  from 0.40  to 0.63  for landlocked  countries  in this sample.  The same  applies  to plnftran.
5)  The Tobit  coefficients  correspond  to the O's  in (5).
154. Comparison and quantification
In this section we compare the results of our three approaches, and do so in a way which
facilitates assessment of the quantitative importance of infrastructure for transport costs and for trade.
4.1 The cost of being landlocked
Table 4 gives the disadvantage of being landlocked, relative to being a median coastal country,
for different values of the own and transit country infrastructure.  The first part of the table, based on
the shipping data, indicates that the median landlocked country has transport costs 58% higher than the
median coastal economy.  However, improving own infrastructure to the level of the best 25th
percentile amongst landlocked countries cuts this cost penalty to 46%;  improvement by the transit cuts
the penalty to 51%, and if both improvements are made, the penalty drops to 39%.  The second part of
the table is based on the cif/fob measure.  This gives somewhat smaller cost penalties, with the median
landlocked economy experiencing transport costs 42% higher than the median coastal economy.
Improving own and transit country infrastructure to the 25h percentile reduces this penalty to 32% and
36% respectively, and if both are improved the penalty drops to 26%.
Comparison of these results assures us that the estimates from our different data sources are
consistent. The cif/fob data predicts relative costs about 16 percentage points lower than the shipping
data at the median infrastructure values perhaps because of the use of import shares in the weighting of
partner characteristics. But, most importantly for our purposes, the partial effects of the own and transit
infrastructure variables are very similar across the data sets as is clear from the plots in Figure I in the
appendix. These plots have two implications for the reliability of the cif/fob results in section 2.3. First,
they indicate that the weighting of partner variables turns out to be relatively unimportant for the own
and transit infrastructure coefficients. Second, the variation of the cif/fob measure explained by the
infrastructure variables does reflect some information contained in that series regarding transport costs.
16Table 4: The cost of being landlocked.
Transport costs of landlocked economy relative to mean coastal economy:  Shipping data
Own Infrastructure Percentiles
25t'  Median  7 5t
Transit  25"t  1.39  1.51  1.66
Infrastructure  Median  1.46  1.58  1.73
Percentiles  75th  1.55  1.67  1.83
Transport costs of landlocked economy relative to mean coastal economy: cif/fob data
Own Infrastructure Percentiles
25"t  Median  75th
Transit  25th  1.26  1.36  1.65
infrastructure  Median  1.32  1.42  1.73
Percentiles  75th  1.36  1.47  1.78
Trade volume of landlocked economy relative to mean coastal economy:
Own Infrastructure percentiles
25th  Median  75th
Transit  25th  0.41  0.32  0.21
Infrastructure  Median  0.38  0.30  0.19
Percentiles  75'  0.34  0.27  0.17
Notes:
1) The construction  of the variables  for the first  two blocks  of the table is as follows:  We calculate  the mean predicted
transport  cost (or cost rate  for the cif/fob)  over  the landlocked  countries  allowing  inf and infiran to vary  but keeping  all
other  variables  at their landlocked  mean.  This  is then divided  by the mean  predicted  transport  cost (or rate for  the cif/fob)
over  the coastal  countries. For the last block a similar  procedure  is used  but the income  levels  used are the same  for both
landlocked  and coastal  countries  so that only  the transport  cost factors  vary.
2) The specifications  used are column  3 table 1, column  5 table 2 and  the last column  in  table 3.
3) The percentiles  are taken  over  the landlocked  countries  sample.
The bottom part of the table undertakes an analogous experiment for trade volumes, asking how
the volume of trade of representative landlocked economies compares with the median coastal
economy given the same incomes, i.e. varying only the transport cost variables.  The difference is
dramatic, with the median landlocked economy having only 30% the trade volume.  Once again, trade
volumes depend on own and transit infrastructure exactly as would be expected, with improvements in
own infrastructure from the median to the 25th  percentile increasing the volume of trade by 8
17percentage points, improvement in transit country infrastructure increasing the volume by 2 percentage
points, and a simultaneous improvement leading to an increase of 11 percentage points in the volume
of trade.
4.2 The elasticity of trade with respect to transport costs.
It is natural to link trade volumes to transport costs by computing the parameter Tr, the elasticity
of trade volumes with respect to transport costs.  We do this by using the estimates from the gravity
and cif/fob models.  Equations (4) and (5) provide over-identifying restrictions for T, eight in total, one
for each of the determinants in the transport cost equations. Given the potential for bias in the
weighted variable coefficients in the cif/fob equation we focus on the unweighted and significant
variables, own and transit infrastructure. The parameter estimates for these variables are given in table
5, and the ratio of the gravity to the cif/fob elasticities gives the elasticity of trade with respect to
transport costs, as given in the last column.
Table 5
Estimates of Import Elasticity w.r.t. the transport cost rate
cif/fob elasticities'  Gravity elasticities  Import elasticity
Inf  Inftran  Inf  Inftran  Inf  Infiran
Point  0.42  0.43  -1.23  -1.02  -2.95  -2.34
Min  0.15  0.11  -1.43  -1.61  -9.81  -15.25
Max  0.69  0.76  -1.02  -1.20  -1.49  -1.57
Notes:
1)  Min  and  max  correspond  to the  95%  confidence  interval  values  for  the  cif/fob  and  gravity  estimates.
2)  The  point  estimate  calculated  from  own  infrastructure,  -2.95,  was  used  in the  calculations  for  the  predicted  transport
costs
3)  cif/fob  elasticities  correspond  from  column  6 table  2
4)  Gravity  elasticities  from  Tobit  estimation,  last  column  table  3
The elasticities implied by the point estimates of either of these measures is very similar, being
-2.95  on the basis of the own infrastructure measure, and -2.34 for the transit infrastructure measure. A
simple test to check if the estimates are consistent with each other was done and failed to reject their
18equality. The message is that doubling the transport cost rate leads to a fall in import value between 5
and 6 times. 22
These calculations and the comparison with results of previous studies assure us that the results
obtained in the different sections of the paper are rather consistent. Not just in the predictive power of
our set of transport cost variables but in the actual estimation of the parameters of the underlying
transport cost equation. We now use them to estimate a bilateral transport cost matrix and apply it to
investigate intra-African transport costs and their impact on trade.
5. Transport  costs,  infrastructure  and Sub-Saharan  African  trade
Our results show how damaging poor infrastructure and landlockedness are to trade.  Let us
extend the quantitative implications of our findings by applying them to Sub-Saharan African (SSA)
trade.  We proceed in two stages.  First, we use the gravity model together with actual SSA trade flows
to predict trade costs on SSA trade - both intra-SSA and with rest of the world.  This shows how much
higher African trade costs are than those of other regions.  Second, we address the question, is African
trade 'too low'?  The answer is that low trade levels are largely explained by infrastructure and
geography.23 24
5.1 Predicted trade costs:
We use our gravity model, as outlined in equations (5) and (5') to produce predictions of trade costs
between pairs of countries. Formally, this involves computing predictions t,y up to a constant from the
equation:
lntij  =  [ 3 lnDistancey  + £4bordery +b 5isldummyj +  6isldummyi+  (6)
+0 7 lnInfj+  8glnInfi+b 9 ln(l+Inftran 1j)+  joln(l+Inftrani)(
22 This  way of estimating  T is similar  to the method  used  by Geraci  and Prewo  (1977)  for 18 OECD  countries  for which
they have bilateral  transport  cost rates. They  find elasticity  estimates  in the range  from -.27 to -2.6, slightly  lower (in
absolute  value)  than the ones we find,  possibly  because  of different  functional  form and the restriction  of their sample
to high  income countries.
23 Evidence  for the importance  of transport  costs for Africa's export  performance  is given by Amjadi  and Yeats (1995)  and
Amjadi,  Reincke  and Yeats (1996).  In the former  study  it is reported  that SSA's net insurance  and freight  payments,
according  to balance  of payments  statitics,  amounted  to 15%  of their exports' value.  By comparison  for all developing
countries  the payments  averaged  5.8%.
24 Collier and Gunning (1999, p. 71) provide a brief description of the quantity and quality of infrastructure in SSA.
19Where the estimated coefficients are the ones from the last column in table 3 and the elasticity used is
the one derived in the previous section from own infrastructure. Results are more readily interpretable
if expressed in $ units, so we take the cost of shipping from Baltimore to Belgium as the reference
point to scale these predicted values. Predicted values can then be interpreted as the $ cost of shipping
a container between locations i and].  (In most of what follows it is the cross journey comparisons that
are interesting, so the reader can dispense with this choice of units if comparative information is all that
is needed).
To assess the reliability of these figures we took the predicted costs from US importers and
compared them to the actual data for shipping costs from Baltimore. If the predicted variable is indeed
a good approximation of nominal transport costs we would expect to find a large positive correlation
(bearing in mind that the shipping data is for a later date and therefore some of the transport cost
determinants may have changed slightly). We find a simple correlation of 0.62 between the two
variables (we get the same correlation if we use the relative costs from (6) directly instead of the
nominal values). Figure II in the appendix plots the constructed transport cost vs. the shipping data.
This assures us that the predicted cost variable contains useful information which we now explore for
Sub-Saharan Africa.
5.2 Intra-African trade costs
To compare the predicted transport costs facing intra-African trade with those in other regions
we first plot in figure 1 the distribution of costs by location of importer and exporter. In figure 1  a the
first category refers to intra-African trade, the second for SSA imports from the rest of the world
(ROW) and the third for imports to/from all countries excluding SSA.  The line in the center of the box
represents the median and the extremes of the box represent the interquartile ranges (2 5 h and 7 5th
percentiles).  Two results stand out: first the median of transport costs for intra-SSA trade, $7,600, is
almost the same as for SSA imports from the ROW and it is over $2,000 higher than for trade
elsewhere (intra-ROW trade).  Second the median of intra-SSA costs stands at about the  7 5 th  percentile
for the intra-ROW costs.  Figure l b compares the intra-SSA costs with those of other regions.  The
contrast is remarkable, the median transport cost for all other regions is below $5,000 i.e. below the
25th  percentile for SSA.  Trade among countries in each of these groups, viz. Latin America and the
Caribbean, East and South Asia and Middle East and North Africa does indeed have a natural
advantage in terms of lower transport costs when compared to intra-African-trade. 25 Finally figure 1  c
25 The median cost  for these  regions  is respectively  $4,600,  $3,900  and $2,100.
20shows that the median cost of trade between SSA and the U.S., Japan or Germany is cheaper, or at least
no more expensive, than the median intra-SSA trade cost.
21Figure 1
Relative African Transport costs (Boxplots by location of importer/exporter)
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Note:  The lines  in the box represent  the 25t,  50h  and 7 5t  percentiles.  The top  extreme  line indicates  x[751]  + ] .5*(x[75  i]-
x[25 t])  or the maximum  if it is lower  than that  value.  The bottom  extreme  line  indicates  x[25t]  - 1 .5*(x[75  §h]-x[25 i])  or
the minimum  if it is higher  than that  value.  Any observations  outside these  lines are represent  individually  by the  dots.
Our predicted values of transport costs are generated for all bilateral pairs of countries in the
sample, including some for which there is not actual trade flow reported.  Comparing the trade costs of
countries which trade with those which do not provides further insight into the importance of transport
costs relative to other factors in determining intra-African trade volumes. This is done in figure 2. We
can see that non-trading partners have average transport costs of $8,000, 50% higher than the average
of trading partners;  for more than three-quarters of non-trading partners transport costs exceed the
mean for trading partners.  This illustrates the obvious fact that transport costs are an important, but not
the only factor behind the small trade volume among some African countries. 26
Table V in the appendix reports some of the predicted transport costs that we have calculated.
It gives transport costs from selected African destinations, expressed relative to the predicted cost of
shipping from Baltimore to Germany.  The columns correspond to the major World and African
26 Non-reporting of trade data for intra-African trade is an important issue here. It is possible that some of the countries
classified  as having  zero trade  are in fact just  not  reporting  data. If these  countries  have  relatively  low  (high)  transport
costs then  the true difference  of transport  costs would  be higher  (lower)  than the one reported  above.
23markets, the rows correspond to African countries sorted by access to the sea and location.  The largest
numbers in the table are for shipping from landlocked countries on one side of the continent to
landlocked countries on the other: shipping from Uganda to Chad, Mali or Niger has predicted
transport costs more than four times higher than shipping from Baltimore to Germany.
The evidence that African trade faces an important obstacle in the form of higher transport costs
is compelling. We now focus on SSA trade flows.
5.3 Is SSA trade  'too low'?
There is a common belief that Africa trades 'too little' both with itself and with the rest of the
World. Frankel (1998) reports intra-regional trade shares in 1990 of 4% for the whole of Africa
compared to 44% for East Asia, and Amjadi et al. (1996) discuss the marginalization of SSA in World
trade. The poor performance is typically attributed to protectionist trade policies (Collier (1995),
Collier and Gunning (1999)) and high transport costs due to poor infrastructure and inappropriate
transport policies (Amjadi and Yeats (1995)).
This view has been contested by Foroutan and Pritchet (1993), who show that the low level of
intra-African trade is explained by the usual determinants of a gravity equation.  Similarly, Coe and
Hoffmaister (1998) conclude that bilateral trade between SSA countries and industrial countries in the
1990's was not unusually low. Finally, Rodrik (1998) finds that the trade/gdp ratios of SSA countries
are comparable to those of countries of similar size and income and that Africa's marginalization is
mainly due to low income growth.
What evidence does our data provide on this, and to what extent can it be accounted for by the
infrastructure variables we have identified as being so important?  To answer this we re-estimated the
baseline and infrastructure specifications of our gravity model, augmenting them with African
dummies: African importer (Africa), exporter (pAfrica), importer and exporter (AA), and  an interaction
of the latter with distance (AAdistance).  Table 6 provides the estimates and investigates whether or not
they survive inclusion of the infrastructure variables.
Starting with the first column of table 6 we find that African countries' bilateral imports and
exports with a non African partner stand at respectively 71% (= exp(-0.34)) and 38% of the level of a
non-SSA country pair.  So the basic gravity specification (income and distance) cannot account for the
poor performance of African trade even when augmented with geographical variables (border and
island dummies).  Column four adds the infrastructure measures.  Including these halves the exporter
disadvantage and leads to a change in sign of the importer dummy implying that poor infrastructure is a
major determinant of the low bilateral trade values of African countries.
24Turning to the issue of Intra-African trade, columnn  two adds a dummy for both partners in SSA.
It is positive and significant but it is not large enough to offset the African importer/exporter
disadvantage.  According to this specification a pair of SSA partner trades only 36% of the value traded
by a non-SSA pair with similar characteristics. 27 This result is overturned with the inclusion of the
infrastructure variables (column five), once these are accounted for a SSA pair trades 17% more than a
non-SSA pair.
In column three we ask if distance is more important in reducing trade between a pair of
African countries by including AAdistance.  Foroutan and Pritchet (1993) use a similar variable and
find that it is insignificant which leads them to conclude that:
"The gravity model gives  little evidence that in  fact  distance is a greater barrier to intra-SSA
trade than it is for  other countries. This result goes against the apparently common feeling  that
the poor  quantity  and quality  of communications and transport  infrastructures  between SSA
countries is a major obstacle to intra-SSA trade "
We find the opposite. Column three shows that Intra-African trade is indeed more responsive to
distance, with an elasticity of -1.63 compared to -1.33  for a non-SSA pair. 28
One way to summarize the results of table 6 is to calculate the critical distance above which an
African pair trades less than a non-African pair.  When infrastructure is not included, this is 90 km,
below the minimum distance between any African pair.  When infrastructure is included (last column)
the critical distance increases to 4915 kmn,  greater than three quarters of intra-African distances.  More
interestingly the majority of country pairs at distances higher than this value are on opposite coasts and
thus the gravity results confirm the fact that Intra-African trade is concentrated at the sub-regional level
with little East-West trade taking place. 29
The main result from this section is that African countries do tend to trade less both with the
ROW and with themselves than would be predicted by a simple gravity model, and the reason for that
is their poor infrastructure. The impact of poor infrastructure on African trade levels may be even
higher than estimated above as it is likely to have an indirect effect through lower income.
27 This is obtained from exp(-0.47-1.12+0.59).
28 The finding in Foroutan and Pritchet (1993) is most likely due to the fact that AA and AAdistance are multicollinear and
thus they are not able to identify either. In our sample the correlation between these variables is over 0.9, there is no
mention of this point in their work.
29  See Yeats (1999) page 58 on this matter.
25Table 6
Value of  imports into country j from country i.  (Tobit)
1  2  3  4  5  6
Inl)istance  -1.39*  -1.35*  -1.33*  -1.21*  -1.16*  -1.14*
(-26.7)  (-25.0)  (-24.4)  (-23.3)  (-21.6)  (-21.0)
lnY  1.38*  1.38*  1.38*  1.21*  1.22*  1.22*
(65.1)  (65.2)  (65.2)  (51.5)  (51.6)  (51.6)
InpY  1.58*  1.58*  1.58*  1.42*  1.42*  1.43*
(74.6)  (74.7)  (74.8)  (60.3)  (60.5)  (60.5)
border  0.49*  0.44***  0.34  0.70*  0.65*  0.56**
(1.99)  (1.81)  (1.36)  (2.86)  (2.68)  (2.23)
isldummy  0.55*  0.54*  0.54*  0.44*  0.42*  0.43*
(5.45)  (5.31)  (5.32)  (4.36)  (4.22)  (4.24)
pisldummy  0.20**  0.19***  0.19  0.13  0.12  0.12
(1.98)  (1.83)  (1.84)  (1.34)  (1.19)  (1.21)
lnInf  -1.28*  -1.29*  -1.30*
(-11.8)  (-12.0)  (-12.0)
lnpInf  -1.29*  -1.30*  -1.31
(-11.9)  (-12.00)  (-12.1)
ln(l+  Inftran)  -1.07*  -1.05*  -1.04'
(-8.41)  (-8.29)  (-8.21)
ln(I +plnftran)  -0.75*  -0.74*  -0.73*
(-5.87)  (-5.77)  (-5.68)
Africa  -0.34*  -0.47*  -0.48*  0.23**  0.07  0.07
(-3.24)  (-4.14)  (-4.16)  (2.08)  (0.64)  (0.61)
pAfrica  -0.98*  -1.12*  -1.12*  -0.45'  -0.61*  -0.61  *
(-9.25)  (-9.65)  (-9.67)  (-4.10)  (-5.15)  (-5.18)
AA  0.59*  2.96*  0.70*  3.09**
(2.95)  (2.06)  (3.56)  (2.22)
AAdistance  -0.30  -0.30
(-1.66)  (-1.74)
N  8556  8556  8556  8556  8556  8556
Pseudo R1 0.22  0.22  0.22  0.23  0.23  0.23
a-  3.16  3.16  3.16  3.07  3.07  3.07
Notes:
1)  ***, **,*  indicates  significance  at 10%,  5%  and 1%  respectively.  t-statistics  in parenthesis
2)  Constant  included  in all specifications  but not reported.
3)  Pseudo  R2=I  -L /ILo  Where 1) is the log  likelihood  value of the model  when  all the regressors  are included  whereas  Lo
corresponds  to the likelihood  when  only  a constant  is included.  This  is not directly  comparable  to the OLS R 2. a gives
the standard  error of the Tobit estimate,  see Appendix  III for details.
fi  Africa=l  if importer is in SSA,pArica=l  if exporter is in SSA, AA=1 if both  partners  are in SSA,
AAdistance=AA*distanceij the variables are zero otherwise.
266.  Conclusion
Transport costs depend on many complex details of geography, infrastructure, administrative
barriers, and the structure of the shipping industry.  In this paper we have used several sources of
evidence to explain transport costs in terms of geography and a measure of the infrastructure of the
trading countries, and of any countries through which their trade passes.
Our approaches are able to explain a high proportion of the cross country variation in transport
costs.  Using one of our data sets we are able to show how land distance is much more costly than sea
distance.  From both data sets, we see that landlocked countries are disadvantaged, although they are
able to overcome a substantial proportion of their disadvantage if their infrastructure, and the
infrastructure of their transit countries, is of high standard.
Analysis of bilateral trade data provides a strong check on the importance of our infrastructure
variables, producing results consistent with the direct estimation of transport costs.  It also enables us to
produce an estimate of the elasticity of trade flows with respect to transport costs, which we find to be
approximately - 2.5.  This is a large number, and means that halving transport costs increases the
volume of trade by a factor of five, or improving infrastructure from the 7 5th  percentile to the 50th
increases the volume of trade by 50%.
Finally, we turn to looking at intra-African trade flows.  These are somewhat lower than would
be predicted by standard gravity modeling, and we show that most of this poor performance can be
explained by our infrastructure variables.
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29Appendix
Table I
Variable  Description  Source  Use
Distance  Great circle distance between trading partners (1000's km  Fitzpatrick (1986),  All
unless In is used)  author's
calculations
Distsea  Sea distance around continents from Baltimore to the sea port  DMA (1985),  Shipping
of landfall (1000's kin)  author's
calculations
Distland  Great circle land distance from sea port of landfall to capital of  Author's  Shipping
destination (1000's km)  calculations
Border  Dummy variable =1 if two countries are contiguous or are  CIA World  Cif/fob,
separated by less than 40 km, 0 otherwise  Factbook  gravity
Inf  Inverse of the index of road, paved road and railway densities  Canning 1998,  All
and telephone lines per capita. A higher value indicates worse  author's
infrastructure (see below for more details).  calculations
Inftran  Average value of infrastructure for the transit countries if a  Canning 1998,  All
country is landlocked, zero otherwise.  UNCTAD,
author's
calculations
Ldldummy  Dummy variable =1 if the country is landlocked, 0 otherwise  CIA World  All
Factbook
lsldummy  Dummy variable =1 if the country is an island, 0 otherwise  CIA World  Gravity,
Factbook  CIF
7TsSlip  Cost  of shipping a 40' container from Baltimore (1000's US  Panalpina  Shipping
$, 1999)
tcif  Ratio of transport costs to free on board value for aggregate  IFS 1995, 1990  Cif/fob
imports of a country (i.e. cif/fob - 1)  series
Y  GDP in current $US market prices  WDI 1998  Gravity
Imports  Aggregate imports data SITC rev.2, 1000's current US$. For  Commtrade  Gravity
some countries with missing data the reported exports from
the partner were used as imports.
Notes: In the text Invariable: stands for the natural logarithm of variable, pvariable: stands for the trade
partner's variable and wvariable 30: stands for the import share weighted sum of variable
30M..
30E.g.:  wx  =  J  X,  where M, is CIF imports of j from i.
30Table II
List of countries in different samples
Shipping  Cif/fob  Gravity
Argentina  Algeria  Argentina
Armenia*  Argentina  Australia
Austria  Australia  Austria
Azerbaijan*  Austria  Bangladesh
Belerus*  Bangladesh  Belgium
Belgium  Belgium  Benin
Benin  Benin  Bolivia
Bhutan  Bolivia  Botswana
Bolivia  Brazil  Brazil
Botswana  Burkina Faso  Bulgaria
Brasil  Burundi  Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso  Cameroon  Burundi
Burundi  Canada  Cameroon
Cameroon  Central African  Canada
Rep.
Central African  Chad  Central African
Rep.  Rep.
Chad  Chile  Chad
Chile  China  Chile
China  Colombia  China
Congo  Zaire  Colombia
Czech Republic*  Congo,Rep  Costa Rica
Eritrea*  Costa Rica  Cote d'Ivoire
Ethiopia*  Cote d'Ivoire  Denmark
Georgia*  Denmark  Dominican
Republic
Germany  Dominican  Ecuador
Republic
Ghana  Ecuador  Egypt, Arab Rep
Hungary  Egypt, Arab Rep  El Salvador
India  El Salvador  Ethiopia
Italy  Finland  Finland
Cote d'Ivoire  France  France
Kazakhstan*  Gabon  Gambia,The
Kenya  Gambia,The  Germany
Kyrgyzstan*  Germany  Ghana
Lesotho  Ghana  Greece
Luxembourg*  Greece  Guatemala
Macedonia*  Guatemala  Guinea
Malawi  Haiti  Guinea-Bissau
Mali  Honduras  Haiti
Moldova*  Hong Kong,China  Honduras
31Shipping  Cif/fob  Gravity
Mozambique  India  Hong Kong,China
Nepal  Indonesia  Hungary
Netherlands  Iran, Islamic Rep  India
Niger  Ireland  Indonesia
Nigeria  Israel  Ireland
Paraguay  Italy  Israel
Peru  Jamaica  Italy
Russia*  Japan  Jamaica
Rwanda  Jordan  Japan
Senegal  Kenya  Jordan
Slovakia*  Korea, Rep  Kenya
South Africa  Madagascar  Korea, Rep
Swaziland  Malawi  Laos PDR
Switzerland  Malaysia  Lesotho
Taijikstan*  Mali  Madagascar
Tanzania  Mauritania  Malawi
Thailand  Mauritius  Malaysia
Togo  Mexico  Mali
Turkey  Mozambique  Mauritania
Turkmenistan*  Nepal  Mauritius
Uganda  Netherlands  Mexico
Uruguay  New Zealand  Mongolia
Uzbekistan*  Nicaragua  Morocco
Zambia  Niger  Mozambique
Zimbabwe  Nigeria  Namibia
Norway  Nepal
Oman  Netherlands
Pakistan  New Zealand
Panama  Nicaragua
















32Shipping  Cif/fob  Gravity
Switzerland  SriLanka
Syrian Arab  Sweden
Republic
Thailand  Switzerland
Togo  Syrian Arab
Republic





United Arab  Turkey
Emirates
United Kingdom  Uganda
United States  United Kingdom
Uruguay  Uruguay
Venezuela  Yemen, Rep




Excluded from the specifications in columns 3 and 4 of Table I in the text due to missing data
for infrastructure.
33Table III
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34Construction of  variables:
Own Infrastructure:  Each country's infrastructure is measured by an index constructed from
four variables; km of road, km of paved road, km of rail (each per sq. Km of country area), and
telephone main lines per person.  These measures are highly correlated among themselves and
identifying each of their influences on transport costs separately is not possible.  One possibility
would have been to build an index using principal components. However, there are only 51
countries for which we have data on all of the measures.  Thus we took the mean over the four
variables, ignoring missing observations. This is equivalent to assuming that roads, paved roads,
railways and telephone lines are perfect substitutes as inputs to a transport services production
function.  Taking the mean over the non-missing variables implicitly assumes that the missing
take on average the same value as the non-missing variables.  This measure was raised to the
power -0.3.  The reason for this is that infrastructure is an input to a transport services
production function which, if Cobb Douglas, might be written as: Y = Ka  ZI where I,  the
index of infrastructure, is exogenous to the transport sector firm. Then for a given output the
reduced form of the cost function will be T = 0  I(a+f)  where 0  is a function of the factor
prices of private inputs, the technology and the target output. If there are CRS to the private
inputs than our assumption is that X = 0.3.  This value implies that the transport cost per km of
the worse infrastructure is approximately ten times that of the best one.  (Since most of the
specifications used are log-linear this transformation is usually irrelevant).
Transit infrastructure.  Let L denote a given landlocked country and Lt the set of transit
countries L uses to reach the sea. Ideally we would use a set of weights that reflect the
probability that the infrastructure of each country in Lt is used by L. However, the available data
reports solely if a country is used for transit or not, so an equal probability of infrastructure use
was assigned to each transit country in Lt .So, if country L uses n transit countries the variable
inftran gives an equal weight of l/n to each of those countries' measure of the infrastructure
index described above.
Three caveats that should be noted.  First, We are assuming that no trade (or the same
share of trade for all countries) goes by air. Although this is clearly unrealistic and the share of
trade that is airborne is rising it is still small enough for landlocked countries to justify this
assumption.  Second, landlocked transport cost to neighbors should not include the cost of going
through transit infrastructure and thus when necessary our variable is adjusted to reflect this fact.
35Table IV:  Summary statistics:
Shipping: All data is for 1998 (n=64)
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation
Sample  Landlocked  Coastal  Sample
n=64  n=35  n=29  n=64
T  .5  8.21  4.62  3.5
Distance  9.58  9.76  9.37  2.39
Distsea  10.5  10.1  10.9  3.75
Distland  .979  I_.5  0.353  1.27
Restricted sample (countries for which infrastructure data is available, n=47)
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation
Sample  Landlocked  Coastal  Sample
n=47  n=21  n=26  n=47
T  5.98  7.95  4.38  3.49
Distance  9.75  10.2  9.37  2.6
Distsea  11.2  11.6  11  3.92
Distland  0.631  0.996  0.336  0.57
Inf  1.72  2.05  1  .44  0.901
Inftran  0.604  1.35  0  0.729
CIF/FOB: All data for 1990 (n=98)
Variable  Mean  Standard deviation
Int,  _____-2.325  0.666
Ininf  0.289  0.458
ininftran  0.139  0.322
wlndistance  1.034  0.651
wlnpinf  -0.112  0.092
wlnpinftran  0.021  0.021
ididummy  0_163  0.372
wbor  0.141  0.177
isldummy  0.153  0.362
wisldummy  0.177  0.116
Gravity (Tobit):  All data for 1990 (n=8556).
Variable  |  Mean  Standard  deviation
In Distance  8.764  0.790
InY  23.772  2.206
InpY  23.772  2.206
Inlnf  0.283  0.470
InpInf  0.283  0.470
In(l+lnftran)  0.155  0.330
In(1  +plnftran)  0.155  0.330
isldummy  0.151  0.358
pisldummy  0.151  <X0.358
horder  __0.027  0.161
36Table V
Predicted transport costs from SSA to selected destinations
FROM/To  US  Germany  Japan  South  Kenya  Zaire  Nigeria  Uganda
Africa
United States  - 1.00  1.03  1.65  1.91  1.98  1.69  2.63
South Africa  1.67  1.25  1.24  - 1.16  1.25  1.41  1.64
Coastal
Zaire  2.08  1.47  1.67  1.30  1.47  - 1.32  1.05
Low/Middle  Kenya  1.98  1,34  1.40  1.19  - 1.45  1.61-  0.54
income  asW  and  Madagaxar  2.50  1.79  1.66  1.24  1.52  2.07  223  2.27
SozJthern  Africa  Mraml&ique  2.63  L  95  1.90  0.55  1.78  203  2.26  2.55
Mauritius  1.54  1.11  0.97  0.87  1,04  1,38  1.44  1.54
Mean  2.15  153  1.52  1.03  1.45  1.7  1.77  1.59
Benin  1.79  1.25  1.57  1.48  1.66  1.35  0.31  2.21
Gambia, The  1.43  1.10  1.43  1.55  1.80  1.67  1.23  2.43
Ghana  1.73  1.23  1.54  1.46  1.67  1.37  0.65  2.22
Low Income  Guinea  1.69  1.29  1.65  1.71  2.00  1.81  1.30  2.71
Western Africa  Guinea-Bissau  1.68  1.29  1.67  1.78  2.07  1.90  1.39  2.79
Mauritania  1.94  1.44  1.94  2.18  2.49  2.34  1.74  3.36
Sierra Leone  1.66  1.27  1.61  1.66  1.94  1.75  1.25  2.62
Togo  1.63  1.15  1.44  1.37  1.54  1.26  0.50  2.05
Mean  1.69  1.25  1.61  1.65  1.90  1.68  1.04  2.55
Cameroon  1.83  1.25  1.51  1.35  1.44  1.03  0,73  1,86
Middle Income  Cole d'Jvoire  1.72  1.25  1.57  1,51  1.75  1.48  0.88  2.34
WesternAfrica  Senegal  1,53  1.17  1.54  1.69  1.95  1.83  1.36  265
-Heaw  1i9  1.23  1.54  1.5S2  1.71  - 1IA4  O."9  2.28
Angola  2.08  1.51  1.69  1.23  1.54  0.69  1.38  2.03
Oilproducers'  Congo, Rep.  2.14  1.51  1.72  1.34  1.51  0.10  1.36  1.95
Gabon  1.87  1.31  1.57  1.34  1.50  0.97  0.95  1.96
Nigeria  1.76  1.23  1.54  1.45  1.62  1.30  - 2.14
Mean  1.96  1.39  1.63  1.34  1.54  0.76  1.23  2.02
Mean Coastal  1.86  1.35  1.58  1.41  1.70  1.46  1.26  2.16
Landlocked
Burundi  2.57  1.76  1.90  1,48  1.14  0.96  1.95  1.32
Mala4wi  2.58  1.84  1.86  1.14  1.37  1i81  2.12  1.99
Low/Middle  Rwanda  1.83  1.24  1.35  1iO8  0.77  OJ69  1.39  0.34.
income East and  Uganda  2.58  1.74  1.87  1.58  0.3  1.03  2.02
Zambia  2.78  2.00  2.06  1.13  1.63  1.14  2.21  2,28
Zimbabwe  2.35  1,70  1.72  0.54  1.40  1.64  1.93  2.00
Mean  2.45  1.72  1.79  1.16  1.14  1.21  1.94  1,59
BurkinaFaso  2.55  1.75  2.31  2.35  2.61  2.30  1.34  3.49
Low Income  Central African Rep.  3.13  2.10  2.48  2.19  2.12  1.05  1.97  2.66
Western Africa  Chad  3.96  2.54  3.22  3.16  3.13  2.87  1.43  4.05
Mali  2.91  2.09  2.74  2.86  3.26  2.94  1.95  4.38
Niger  3.20  2.14  2.83  2.89  3.14  2.78  0.95  4.17
Mean  3.15  2.13  2.72  2.69  2.85  2.39  1.53  3.75
Mean landlocked  2.77  1.90  2.21  1.86  1.92  1.75  1.75  2.67
Notes:  1) The country classification is the one used by the World Bank
2) The choice of African countries in the columns reflects the largest markets in each of the SSA regions and a landlocked country,
Uganda.
3) * Transport costs for petroleum products are typically higher than for other products thus it is likely that these values
underestimate the true transport cost for the oil producers' exports but they are indicative of their  import  costs.
37Figure  I
Relative Transport  Cost of Landlocked  countries
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38Figure II
Predicted transport cost $US of 40' container vs. actual data
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